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Abstract 
We propose a new normative approach to designing institutional commitments in environments that 
are subject to a time inconsistency problem, à la Kydland and Prescott (1977). This approach captures 
the idea that institutions should be chosen in a way that is time consistent: if a commitment is found to 
be best in some sense today, it should remain best in the same sense tomorrow. This property is not 
satisfied by the usual Ramsey plan, but it can be achieved by placing appropriate restrictions on the 
choice set of possible commitments. Using a canonical capital tax problem as a laboratory, we 
consider the implications for institutional design of restricting choice to sets that exhibit this form of 
time consistency. We show that any optimal plan within a time-consistent choice set must converge to 
a steady state that differs from the long-run outcome under Ramsey policy. In particular, this outcome 
exhibits positive long-run capital taxes. This occurs because a time-consistent policy cannot have both 
high initial capital taxes and zero long-term rates. A policymaker who discounts the future will always 
be willing to accept long-run distortions in order to tax the inelastic initial capital stock. 
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1 Introduction
Time inconsistency problems are near-ubiquitous in macroeconomic policy de-
sign. Whenever agentsexpectations of the future inuence what a government
can do today, and whenever these expectations can in turn be a¤ected by future
policy choices, the actions of policymakers in the future act as a constraint on
the present. Unless future policymakers are institutionally constrained by ac-
cumulated obligations, they will have no reason to consider the e¤ects of their
choices on past expectations. The resulting outcome need not lie on the dy-
namic Pareto frontier: policymakers in every time period could be made better
o¤ under an alternative feasible plan. This troubling feature of discretionary
choice was, of course, rst formalised by Kydland and Prescott (1977), who in-
ferred from it the broad recommendation that repeated choice was to be avoided
where possible. Policy should be based on rules rather than discretion.
The main focus of the current paper is on how these rules institutions,
as we label them  should be designed. This focus is unusual, as the main
distinction drawn in the literature is between governments that can commit
and governments that cannot.1 Once the fact of commitment is given, the
assumption is that it will be to a Ramsey-optimal plan i.e., the best feasible
allocation from the perspective of the rst period of the model.2 We instead
dene and characterise the new concept of time-consistent institutional design,
and show that it has a number of features that make it an appealing alternative
to Ramsey policymaking.
Ramsey plans have two related features that make them unlikely practi-
cal solutions to institutional design problems. First, they are time-contingent.
Even in purely deterministic models, the Ramsey-optimal policy choice for a
given state of the economy will vary depending on the number of time periods
that have elapsed since optimisation rst took place. The best capital tax rate
for period 0 is di¤erent from the best capital tax rate for period t > 0, even if the
capital stock in these two periods is identical. This means that Ramsey policy
cannot be viewed as a set of rulesin the common sense of the term: that is,
time-invariant functions mapping from the observed state of the economy to an
optimal choice. As a consequence, apparently straightforward economic policy
questions  such as: What is the best rate of ination to target?, or: How
should taxes respond to the economic cycle?are not answered directly by the
solution to a Ramsey plan. At the same time, Markovian discretionary policy
of the sort recently analysed by Klein et al. (2008), among others takes as
1The literature contrasting commitment and discretionary outcomes in di¤erent settings
is huge, and we do not attempt to do it justice here. Recent contributions include  but
are not limited to Klein, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2008), Debortoli and Nunes (2013), Song,
Storesletten and Zilibotti (2012), Yared (2010), Martin (2009), Díaz-Giménez et al. (2008)
and Ellison and Rankin (2007).
2An intermediate point is found by the literature on loose commitment, in which the
policymaker is permitted to re-optimise in each period with a given probability: see, for
instance, Debortoli and Nunes (2010) and Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007). Nonetheless,
this literature retains the perspective that when commitment plans are designed, they are
designed to be best from the perspective of the current time period.
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given that institutional commitment is impossible. It need not have particularly
desirable welfare policies, for the well-known reasons rst emphasised by Kyd-
land and Prescott. Given the unsatisfactory character of both of these options,
the danger is that important policy questions may consequently be resolved in
an ad hoc fashion, without clear reference to a meaningful optimality concept 
even in environments where well-established economic models would be ideally
suited to giving guidance. Our main motivation for developing the idea of time-
consistent institutional design is precisely to o¤er a more realistic framework for
optimal policy choice, allowing good economic models to have greater practical
inuence. As discussed in Section 2, we are not the rst authors to seek justi-
ed pragmatismof this kind, but to date there remains no generally-accepted
approach.
To be clear, the time-contingency property just discussed is a feature of
Ramsey policy notwithstanding the fact that a Ramsey plan may be represented
as solving a recursive choice problem. The works of Marcet and Marimon (2014)
and Abreu, Pearce and Stachetti (1990) in particular have greatly expanded the
analytical toolkit available when solving for Ramsey policy showing how a state
vector augmented with either Lagrange multipliers or promise values delivers
recursivity. But in each case the value of this augmented state vector in a given
time period will depend on the time that has elapsed since optimisation. The
rst period of the problem, for instance, will never feature binding obligations
related to past promises, whereas later periods will. The natural state vector
alone will thus not be enough to determine policy choice in a given period.
The second, closely-related feature that makes Ramsey policy unappealing
from a normative perspective is that it is time-inconsistent. An institutional
designer xing Ramsey policy from period 0 onwards will choose a di¤erent set
of outcomes for time period t > 0 than an institutional designer xing Ramsey
policy from a later period s  t onwards. This is troubling when the Ramsey
perspective is used to analyse public policy rather than, say, dynamic contracts
among private agents because legislative bodies in many countries simply do
not have the right to bind their successors.3 If a subsequent government were
to re-assess a previous Ramsey commitment according to the same Ramsey
paradigm, it would nd that the previous commitment is no longer best. It is
hard to see how an institution of this kind could come into being in some initial
period 0, but face no subsequent threat to its continued existence. As Lars
Svensson (1999) has put it: Why is period 0 special?.
Like time contingency, time inconsistency remains present despite the fact
that the Ramsey choice problem can be made recursive via an expanded state
vector. Ex-post, policymakers will always have an incentive to reset the el-
ements of the state vector that correspond to promises xing the inherited
vector of multipliers to zero, or the inherited promise values to a level such
that any associated constraints are slack. Again, in a microeconomic dynamic
contracting environment this will not be a problem so long as contracts can be
3This is especially true of countries such as the United Kingdom in which the legislature
is legally sovereign, and not subject to oversight by any constitutional court.
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enforced: legal punishments can e¤ectively make inherited promises natural
states. But dynamic contracts are not the relevant institutional framework
when thinking about public policy.
The time inconsistency of Ramsey plans is an unavoidable feature of Kydland
and Prescott problems. But at the same time, the Ramsey framework allows for
very substantial freedom of choice on the part of the institutional designer, and
in this regard it may be posing an unrealistic problem. For every time period,
and where relevant every history of exogenous shocks, a di¤erent promise
can be chosen. This is very di¤erent from the problem of, say, choosing a single
ination target to endure for a large number of years. In that case there is
a straightforward cross-restriction on the promises that can be set in di¤erent
periods: they must all equal one another. Such cross-restrictions are arguably
the norm rather than the exception when long-term economic policy is being
legislated. It is extremely rare in practice for directly time-contingent policies
to be committed to ex ante.
The main point of our paper is that time inconsistency is directly connected
to the freedom of choice given to a Ramsey planner. We show how appropriately-
chosen cross-restrictions on the set of possible dynamic commitments can result
in an institutional design problem that  unlike the Ramsey plan  is time-
consistent. That is, the optimal commitment from this restricted set of institu-
tions in period 0 would still be judged optimal, within the same restricted set,
if it were reassessed at a later date.4 This focus on restricted choice sets can be
rationalised normatively as a requirement that no generation should be granted
special privileges relative to its successors. The Ramsey plan can always be
viewed as a solution that assumes the period-0 institutional designer is granted
unrestricted choice, but this plan would survive ex-post reassessment only if
later generations faced greatly restricted choice sets by comparison. We are
interested in the consequences of symmetric restrictions on the choice sets that
institutional designers of di¤erent generations are allowed, whilst still allowing
as much meaningful scope for choice as possible.
We study the properties of institutions that are optimal time-consistent
choices of this sort, using as our laboratory a deterministic capital tax problem
in the spirit of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985), with a simplifying assumption
that the government must run a balanced budget. This is an ideal environment,
as it is a model in which Ramsey policy involves particularly acute asymmetries
over time: initial-period capital taxes are always implausibly high, but in the
long run they converge to zero.
In this context we associate institutional choice more specically with choice
over dynamic sequences of promise values. These promise values are then treated
as exogenous restrictions on a day-to-daypolicy choice problem. The promise
values are real numbers, corresponding to minimal levels of post-tax wealth that
4The idea of reassessmenthere di¤ers from actual choice, as we do not want to reduce the
institutional design problem to a Stackelberg game. We assume that institutional designers
always assess options under the assumption that their chosen institution will endure inde-
nitely. The question is whether the best choice under this assumption will be a time-consistent
one.
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the consumer must be allowed to possess each period in a market equilibrium.
When they constrain day-to-day choice, it is to rule out arbitrarily high cap-
ital taxation. Ramsey policy follows from choosing these promises optimally
from the unrestricted choice set R1, under the period-0 welfare criterion. Our
perspective is still that they should be chosen optimally from the perspective
of period 0, but that this selection should instead be from a restricted choice
set within which choice is time-consistent. This is what we call time-consistent
institutional design.
1.1 Preview of main results
The requirement for time-consistent institutional choice restricts the problem
considerably, but not completely. In particular, our rst main result is that
a time-consistent institutional design problem can have at most one meaning-
ful degree of freedom for policy choice. Thus the cross-restrictions that link
promises in di¤erent periods must have the e¤ect of reducing the institutional
designers choice set to at most a family of elements of R1, indexed by just
one parameter. Choice over this parameter is the only decision that a time-
consistent institutional designer faces. This is obviously a very restricted choice
by comparison with the Ramsey planners, but it is not wholly unrealistic. It
implies the same degree of freedom that policymakers accept willingly whenever
they legislate for policy variables that are not time-varying.
Having demonstrated that time-consistent choice is at most unidimensional,
we next begin to place structure on this choice. We make three parsimonious
assumptions relating to the institutional designers choice set, capturing the
idea that this set should allow as much scope for choice as possible. Specically,
we assume that the choice set contains one degree of freedom everywhere, and
that it allows for meaningful variation in promises at all horizons as the single
policy parameter is varied. We show that these assumptions together are enough
to pin down a unique steady-state outcome for time-consistent policy in the
given optimal tax model. Importantly the capital tax rate associated with this
steady state will always be positive, irrespective of parameter values. It is 21
per cent for our benchmark case. This is in sharp contrast with the steady-
state of Ramsey-optimal policy, which sets capital taxes to zero. The reason
for the di¤erence is that when choice is limited to one degree of freedom, the
policymaker must trade o¤ the relative benets of high initial capital taxes and
low steady-state rates. Even though capital taxes may adjust over time as the
state of the economy evolves, positive initial tax rates cannot be selected in a
time-consistent choice set unless they are accompanied by positive steady-state
rates. The result that the steady state of Ramsey policy does not coincide
with the steady state from optimal time-consistent choice is very general, and
calls into question the intrinsic desirability of the Ramsey steady state viewed
independently of the transition to it.
Finally we consider time-consistent capital taxes on the transition path as the
capital stock accumulates. For this we need to place signicantly more structure
on the choice problem: the parsimonious assumptions that determine steady
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state are too weak to x a unique transition. We add two further restrictions
the rst ensuring that for a given capital stock the chosen policy will always
be the same, irrespective of time, and the second that no policymaker enivies
another, in the sense of preferring the optimal promise sequence available when
the capital stock takes a di¤erent value. When these restrictions hold, we show
that there is a single possible time-consistent institutional choice, and that it
sets the promise value equal to a constant in all time periods. This is not as
restrictive as it rst appears, for reasons that we explain. The exact character of
capital and labour taxes along the resulting transition will depend on the precise
parameterisation, but in all cases the departures of taxes from their steady-state
values are an order of magnitude smaller than under Ramsey policy. And unlike
Ramsey policy, if the initial capital stock is at its steady-state level, all variables
in the economy remain constant indenitiely.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 places our con-
tribution in the broader policy design literature. Section 3 presents a simple
deterministic social insurance problem without state variables, which we use
to motivate our broader search for time-consistent institutions. Section 4 in-
troduces the main capital tax problem that we study, and decomposes it into
separate day-to-dayand institutional designproblems. Section 5 then for-
malises our notion of time-consistent institutional design, and characterises its
implications for steady-state outcomes. Section 6 considers transition dynamics,
and section 7 concludes. An appendix collects proofs.
2 Related literature
Our concept of time-consistent institutional design is to the best of our knowl-
edge novel, but a number of strands of the policy design literature relate closely
to what we do. A di¤erent concept of time-consistent public policy has received
signicant recent attention in the literature. This focuses on the positive analy-
sis of Markovian equilibria in the dynamic Stackelberg game among successive
policymakers when commitment is not possible. Recent papers to apply this
perspective in various settings include Klein and Ríos-Rull (2003), Ortigueira
(2006), Klein, Krusell and Ríos-Rull (2008), Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008), Mar-
tin (2009), Blake and Kirsanova (2012), Reis (2013) and Niemann, Pichler and
Sorger (2013). The basic assumption of this literature is that policy is chosen
sequentially as a function of the economys natural state vector, with every gen-
eration of policymakers treating the response function of its successors as given.
We instead suppose that policy is chosen once-and-for-all at the start of time,
but from a restricted set that is constructed to ensure that this choice would still
be considered optimal if it were reassessed at a later date. Our notion of time
consistency therefore relates to the once-and-for-all institutional design choice,
not sequential choice on the part of successive discoordinated generations.
Like this literature we obtain policies that are functions only of the aggregate
state of the economy, at least in deterministic settings of the type considered in
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this paper.5 But unlike it, our work is explicitly normative: the dynamic alloca-
tions that we generate can meaningfully be described as optimal time-consistent
plans, albeit subject to the constraints required for time consistency. They are
the outcomes of constrained choice over entire dynamic policy sequences, not of
isolated, strategic period-by-period choice.
The concept in the literature that comes closest to our notion of time-
consistent institutional design for Kydland and Prescott problems is the time-
less perspective of Woodford (1999, 2003, 2010). Like ours, Woodfords ap-
proach aims to address the fact that practical policy design does not gener-
ally consider time-contingent policy of the sort that is Ramsey-optimal. Since
Ramsey-optimal policy will generally converge to a steady state, his proposal is
to implement this steady-state allocation from the start of time. The norma-
tive justication for doing so is that such a policy would have been best for a
policymaker optimising in the distant past.
Woodfords approach has initiated a useful discussion on how best to design
time-non-contingent policy commitments, to which this paper is a contribution.
But unfortunately it has a number of weaknesses. In general it is not clear
why the long-run outcome of Ramsey policy should be viewed as desirable,
independently of the transition path to steady state. In the simplest possible
time inconsistency problems deterministic settings with no state variables 
the timeless perspective policy will be completely constant over time, but it will
be welfare-dominated in the set of such constant policies. This point is made
more fully in section 3 below. It relates to a similar point made by Blake (2001)
in the context of a stochastic New Keynesian stabilisation problem, where the
timeless perspective policy was shown to generate a higher expected value for
the loss function than a specic alternative. In this paper we restrict our focus
to deterministic environments. If there are additionally no state variables, the
optimal time-consistent institution that we study will deliver the best constant
policy, unlike the timeless perspective.
A similar though less formal focus on Ramsey steady-state outcomes has
also characterised much of the literature on optimal capital taxation in com-
plete markets. Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), for instance, focus their pol-
icy advice exclusively on the long-run result of a zero tax rate in Chamley-Judd
settings, arguing informally that lags in implementation would render optimal
transition dynamics irrelevant: the steady-state of optimal policy should be tar-
geted immediately. We instead nd that a positive steady-state tax should be
chosen by a time-consistent institutional designer. A similar nding has pre-
viously been obtained either by relaxing the complete markets assumption of
the standard Ramsey approach,6 or by conducting the analysis in an overlap-
ping generations setting,7 or both.8 Our analysis instead retains the complete-
markets structure of the classic Chamley-Judd setting, with a single innitely-
5 In stochastic models it will be desirable to condition on the history of exogenous shocks.
We neglect this dimension in the present work for simplicity.
6For instance, Aiyagari (1995) and ·Imrohoro¼glu (1998).
7For instance, Alvarez et al. (1992) and Erosa and Gervais (2002).
8See, in particular, Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009).
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lived representative agent. The reason we obtain positive steady-state capital
taxes is that time-consistent policy forces a trade-o¤ between initial capital tax
rates and their long-run levels. It is only by accepting long-run distortions that a
time-consistent institutional designer can tax away inelastic capital in period 0.
This trade-o¤ is not captured appropriately by policy advice that recommends
an immediate jump to the Ramsey steady state.
3 An example without states
Before considering the optimal capital tax model that will be our main focus,
it helps to x some ideas in a simple setting without state variables. Con-
sider a two-period deterministic overlapping generations economy in the style
of Samuelson (1958). Within each generation, half of the agents are born lucky
and receive a relatively high lifetime endowment, whilst half are born unlucky
and receive a relatively low lifetime endowment. These endowments, which are
publicly observable, are denoted

y1;h; y2;h
	
for the lucky agent and

y1;l; y2;l
	
for the unlucky agent:.9 These endowments are assumed to satisfy the four
inequalities: y1;h > y2;h, y1;l > y2;l, y1;h > y1;l and y2;h  y2;l. Thus both
agents receive higher endowments when they are young, which allows for the
well-known possibility that market outcomes may be dynamically Pareto ine¢ -
cient.
Individual lifetime utility functions are common for all agents in all genera-
tions, and take a standard time-separable form:
U
 
c1; c2

= u
 
c1

+ u
 
c2

(1)
where c1 is the agents consumption when young and c2 when old, and u ()
is increasing and strictly concave. A paternalistic government exists that has
preferences over the welfare of all agents in all current and future time peri-
ods. These preferences assessed in some period t  0 are described by the
objective Wt:
Wt :=
1X
s=t
s t
X
i2fh;lg

u
 
c1;is

+ u
 
c2;is

(2)
where c1;hs is the consumption of the young, high-endowment agent in period s,
and so on.
The government wishes to commit to a permanent social security scheme
that will transfer resources from rich to poor, subject to the restriction that
participation in the scheme will be voluntary so in each period all agents must
be left at least as well o¤ as they would be if they were to opt out, and consume
their endowment alone. This implies participation constraints for all types in
all periods. We will focus on the case in which the participation constraint of
9Superscripts 1 and 2 denote the relevant time period of the agents life, and h and l denote
high and low values respectively.
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young, high-endowment agents is the only binding restriction. This constraint,
in generic period t, is:
u

c1;ht

+ u

c2;ht+1

 u  y1;h+ u  y2;h (3)
In addition to this restriction, there is an aggregate resource constraint that
must hold in each time period:
c1;ht + c
2;h
t + c
1;l
t + c
2;l
t  y1;h + y2;h + y1;l + y2;l (4)
3.1 Institutional design, and day-to-day policy
Despite the relative simplicity of the setup, for the purposes of the subsequent
discussion it is instructive to divide the participation constraint (3) into two
parts: a promise-makingrestriction and a promise-keepingrestriction. This
is just a matter of dening a sequence f!tg1t=0 such that for all t  0 we have:
u

c1;ht

+ !t+1  u
 
y1;h

+ u
 
y2;h

(5)
and:
u

c2;ht

 !t (6)
where !t+1 is thus the amount of utility that has been promised to old, high-
endowment agents in period t + 1. The version of constraint (6) for period 0
is not a fundamental restriction on optimal commitment strategies from period
0 onwards, and when selecting Ramsey policy we can always let !0 take a
su¢ ciently low value that it is not binding. We nonetheless include the period-
0 restriction in our description of the constraint set, as our concept of time-
consistent institutional design will admit the possibility that it could bind. For
notational ease we hereafter use the notation !0;s to refer to a nite sequence
of promises from period 0 to period s, f!tgst=0, and !0;1 to denote an innite
sequence f!tg1t=0.
We consider that a policymaker has access to a commitment device when
they are able to x an innite sequence !0;1, such that the promise-keeping
constraint is binding in some or all periods. Our main focus will be on alternative
approaches to determining such sequences.
For any given !0;1 2 R1, we can consider the problem of how best to choose
a consumption allocation such that these promises are satised at all horizons.
In the initial period 0 this takes the form:
max
fc1;lt ;c1;ht ;c2;lt ;c2;ht g1t=0
1X
s=0
s
X
i2fh;lg

u
 
c1;is

+ u
 
c2;is

subject to the resource constraint (4), the promise-making constraint (5), the
promise-keeping constraint (6), and !0;1. The constraint set for this problem
is easily seen to be convex, and the objective criterion is concave. Provided
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feasibility can be satised, it will thus have a unique solution. This problem can
be thought of as one solved by a day-to-daybureaucratic policymaker, admin-
istering the practical aspects of choice under a given institution represented
by the xed sequence of promises. We denote the value of the allocation that
solves this problem V d0
 
!0;1

.10 Importantly, the allocation that solves the
day-to-day problem is entirely time-consistent. Inconsistency in general derives
from the incentive to reset promise values that have previously been xed, which
by construction does not apply to a choice problem that abstracts from the
determination of the !t terms.
Formally, time inconsistency can be viewed as a change over time in the pol-
icymakers preference ranking over promise sequences. The function V d0
 
!0;1

describes a complete, reexive and transitive binary preference relation over the
space of all !0;1 2 R1, labelled %0. The same function can be used to describe
a conditional preference ordering over promises from t onwards, !t;1, given
some assumption about the determination of !0;t 1. We will focus on the case
in which, for the given choice of !t;1:
!0;t 1 2 arg max
f!0;t 1:f!0;t 1;!t;1g2
0g
V d0
 
!0;t 1; !t;1

with 
0  R1 a constraint set from which promise sequences must be chosen,
explained fully below. Generically these preferences are labelled %0;t. Likewise,
a relation %1 will describe the preferences in period 1 over commitments from
period 1 onwards, mapped by V d1
 
!1;1

, with %1;t taking a corresponding
conditional denition, and so on.
The essence of the time inconsistency problem is that these preference rank-
ings do not coincide. In particular, the preference ranking %0;t on R1 will not
coincide with %t:11 desirable plans from t onwards viewed from the perspective
of period 0 need no longer be desirable when viewed from the perspective of
period t. Notably, the policymaker in period t will not see the value in allowing
the promise-keeping constraint for period t to bind, whereas the policymaker in
period 0 will benet from faithfulness.
The institutional design problem is how best to select a sequence !0;1 2
R1, given time inconsistency. As in the Ramsey paradigm, we will assume
that this problem is solved once and for allin period 0, based on the period-
0 the preference relation %0. Importantly, however, this choice will not be
unrestricted. Analytically the institutional design problem we study takes the
form:
max
!0;12
0
V d0
 
!0;1

(7)
where 
0  R1 is a constraint set from which the promises can be selected.12
Alternative structures for this constraint set will be the main focus of our analy-
sis.
10 If the constraint set is empty we set V d0
 f!tg1t=0 =  1.
11That is, there will be !0 and !00 in R1 such that !0 %0;t !00 but not !0 %t !00.
12The 0 subscript denotes the period in which institutional choice is being made. This will
be of relevance when we consider time consistency.
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The separation between institutional design and day-to-day policymaking
is made more for heuristic than mathematical reasons. Combining the two
problems into a single, joint choice over real allocations and promises would
deliver the same policy, since the separated formulation takes the max-max
form. But since our focus is on the idea of institutional design per se, it is
useful to be able to isolate a problem that captures exclusively this.
3.2 Optimal choice
It is straightforward to characterise optimal choice in this setting, both analyti-
cally and numerically. Consistent with the distinction that we have just drawn,
we rst specify optimal choice for the innerday-to-day problem, given an ar-
bitrary !0;1 sequence. We then consider di¤erent approaches to solving the
outerinstitutional design problem.
3.2.1 Day-to-day choice
Given !0;1, and placing multipliers tt, 
t1t and 
t2t on constraints (4), (5)
and (6) in turn, the optimal day-to-day policy choice is characterised by:
t = u
0

c1;ht
  
1 + 1t

(8)
t = u
0

c2;ht
  
1 + 2t

(9)
t = u
0

c1;lt

(10)
t = u
0

c2;lt

(11)
together with complementary slackness. These are the standard requirements
for optimal cross-sectional resource allocation: the weighted value of the mar-
ginal utility of consumption is equalised across all agents, with the e¤ective
Pareto weight of high-type agents being increased above the underlying utili-
tarian value of 1 whenever constraints (5) and (6) bind.13
3.2.2 Institutional design: Ramsey policy
We now turn to the institutional design problem. Under Ramsey policy there
is no restriction on the set of promise values from which choice can be made:

0 = R1. A standard application of the envelope theorem yields the following
necessary optimality condition for choice of !t:
1t = 
2
t+1 (12)
for all t  0 and:
20 = 0 (13)
13Marcet and Marimon (2014) and Mele (2011) have emphasised this interpretation of
shadow values on incentive constraints as contributing to Pareto weights.
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These requirements are very familiar from the work of Marcet and Marimon
(2014) and others. Two aspects are worth emphasising. First, the policymaker
nds it optimal to let any increase in the Pareto weight of high-endowment
agents be fully persistent over time, so that it remains at its initial value, 1t ,
even when the participation constraint has ceased to bind. This persistence
property follows from the optimal spreading of resources over time, and is a very
common feature of Ramsey-optimal policy in the class of models with binding
participation constraints. Second, as mentioned already, the Ramsey policy-
maker never has any incentive to let the initial promise !0 constrain choice,
since old, high-type agents in period 0 are not at risk of exiting the scheme.
From (9) this means that the consumption level of old, high-type agents in pe-
riod 0 will equal that of low-type agents, and this will relax somewhat the initial
resource constraint.
These features are evident in the dynamic paths of consumption for the dif-
ferent agents under the Ramsey plan, which we plot in Figure 1 for an illustrative
calibration.14
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Figure 1: Ramsey-optimal consumption dynamics
The Figure conrms the general lesson discussed in the introduction: despite
14Specically, we assume y1;h = 2:5, y2;h = 0:625, y1;l = 0:625 and y2;l = 0:25, giving a
mean endowment of 1. Consumption utility is assumed to be CES, with elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution set to 0:5. We assume  = 0:9630 ' 0:29, reecting a four-per-cent annual
interest rate and a 30-year gap between generations.
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the fact that the economic environment is completely stationary, the Ramsey-
optimal social security scheme features non-trivial dynamics. The relatively
slack resource constraint in period 0 means that it is optimal initially to front-
load the incentives provided to young, high-endowment agents. This imparts
further dynamics to the optimal plan, as old, high-endowment types in period
1 will have received a very high allocation in period 0, and so will not require
so great a transfer in period 1. This in turn frees up resources in period 1,
allowing the incentives of the new generation of high-endowment agents again
to be frontloaded. This dynamic continues, and steady state is reached only
gradually. In steady state all high-endowment agents, young and old, receive
the same high consumption level, and all low-endowment agents receive the
same low consumption level.
3.2.3 Institutional design: constant policy
As discussed in the introduction, in many environments the time-contingent
character of Ramsey policy makes it an impractical choice for actual delega-
tion policies. This motivates a search for more realistic alternatives a project
initiated by Woodford (1999). The useful feature of the current setting, which
is both deterministic and free from natural state variables, is that once intrin-
sic dynamics in the promises have been eliminated the chosen policy must be
entirely constant. There are no shocks or wealth accumulation dynamics that
might provide an alternative source of variation. The characteristics of optimal
constant policy are very easy to analyse, and provide an unambiguous basis
from which to generalise to more complex problems.
Suppose, therefore, that the choice set for the institutional design problem
were to include only dynamic promise sequences that are constant. That is:

0 =

!0;1 2 R1 : !s = !t;8s; t  0
	
What are the implications of maximising V d0
 
!0;1

on this restricted set?
Dening multipliers as before, the following necessary condition is easily ob-
tained: 1X
t=0
t+11t =
1X
t=0
t2t (14)
With constant promises and a stationary environment, the outcome of the
day-to-day problem will clearly be a set of four constant consumption values,
c1;h; c2;h; c1;l; c2;l
	
, and it follows from this that the multipliers will also be
time-invariant. Condition (14) then reduces to:

1
= 
2
(15)
This implies a subtle di¤erence in the treatment of past obligations between
a Ramsey-optimal institution and an optimal constant institution. The e¤ective
Pareto weight of old, high-endowment agents is now lower than for young, high-
endowment agents:

1 + 
1

as opposed to

1 + 
1

. Under the Ramsey
13
plan these weights were constant for the two periods of the agents lifetime 
though potentially di¤ering across generations which in turn ensured identical
steady-state consumption levels for young and old high-endowment agents. Now
steady state is imposed from the start of time, but the allocations di¤er.15 The
promise values associated with the steady state of Ramsey-optimal policy are
clearly available to the designer of the optimal constant institution, so it follows
that the Ramsey steady state is welfare-dominated in the set of time-invariant
policies. This is an important result, despite the simplicity of the environment:
it strongly suggests that the steady state of Ramsey policy may not be an
appropriate starting point when designing more realistic commitments than the
Ramsey plan.
To illustrate the di¤erences, Figure 2 superimposes the optimal constant
allocation on the Ramsey-optimal dynamics. Under the constant institution,
the consumption of young, high-endowment agents is now around 60 per cent
greater than that of old, high-endowment agents. The consumption of low-
endowment agents is higher under the optimal constant institution than the
Ramsey-optimal institution in every period except for the rst.
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Figure 2: Optimal constant consumption dynamics
Assessed in terms of the social welfare criterion W0, the Ramsey-optimal
allocation obviously dominates the constant policy: by denition it is the best
15They would coincide only if  ! 1.
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allocation when !0;1 is completely unrestricted. But if one compares the con-
tinuation value of the two policies over time, the constant allocation is superior
after just one (generation-length) period. Figure 3 demonstrates this. It charts
over time the permanent, uniform consumption level that is equivalent in social
welfare terms to the continuation value of each of the two policies.16 .
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Figure 3: Welfare comparison: Ramsey vs optimal constant policy
3.3 The time-consistency of constant choice
For the purposes of this paper there are two main points that this simple exam-
ple highlights. The rst is that a Ramsey steady state is only desirable as part
of a complete dynamic Ramsey plan. It need not have particularly favourable
welfare properties per se, and this is certainly enough to question its relevance as
a focal point in more complex environments with state variables and stochastic
shocks.17 The timeless perspectiveof Woodford (1999) would recommend im-
plementing this Ramsey steady-state from period 0 onwards, but this is clearly
welfare-dominated in the set of constant policies. This motivates searching for
16So for a given period t and a given dynamic allocation from t onwards, Figure 3 shows
the consumption level (relative to the average endowment value) such that if all agents of
all generations were to receive this consumption value in all periods from t onwards, the
continuation value of social welfare would be the same as under the chosen policy.
17For the remainder of the paper we will focus on an example with the former  leaving a
full consideration of policy in stochastic environments to further work.
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an alternative perspective on time-non-contingent choice that like the timeless
perspective will be applicable in more complex environments, but does not
su¤er from so clear a normative failure.
The second important feature of the example central to the arguments that
follow  is the time-consistency of the constant institutional design problem.
Since there are no state variables responding to institutional choice, the best
constant promise to enact from period 0 onwards must be the same as from any
arbitrary period t onwards. Indeed, the entire preference ordering over constant
promises is unchanging through time. Formally, let 
t be the set of promises
permitted from t onwards under 
0:

t =

!t;1 2 R1 :  !0;t 1; !t;1 2 
0 for some !0;t 1 2 Rt	
If 
0 is the set of constant promises, clearly so too is 
t. Now consider the
conditional preference ranking%0;t on 
t. Given the stationarity of the problem,
it is immediate that this must coincide with %t. That is, rankings in 
t from
the perspective of an institutional designer in period 0 are the same as from the
perspective of an institutional designer in period t.
Importantly, Ramsey policy does not satisfy this form of time consistency.
Suppose 
0 = R1. It is clear from Figure 2 that if a policymaker were to select
an optimal Ramsey plan from period t > 0 onwards, allocations would di¤er
relative to continuing with the optimal period-0 plan. Hence the ranking %0;t
over 
t = R1 must di¤er from %t, and time consistency must be violated. In
order to justify a Ramsey plan as an optimal institution, therefore, one must be
willing to accept that the policymaker in period 0 has a unique privilege relative
to his or her successors: the freedom to impose a choice of promises that will be
regretted ex post, given the same set of options. When time consistency obtains,
there are no such regrets.
This notion of time consistency as lack of regretdi¤ers from the notion com-
monly associated with discretionary policymaking, and studied by Klein et al.
(2008), Díaz-Giménez et al. (2008) and others. In these papers the assumption
is that institutional commitments of any form are impossible, meaning that
promise-keeping constraints can never bind. Private-sector expectations fully
account for this, and time-consistent policyin this literature is the outcome of
the Stackelberg game that results. We instead allow for a perfect commitment
device, so that expectations can be fully inuenced by institutional choice, and
past promises can bind. We seek time consistency in the choice over complete
sequences of promises, not of period-by-period allocations.
There is an undeniable tension in the requirement that a commitment strat-
egy should be time-consistent in the sense we describe. The whole point of
commitment is that it should provide a cast-ironpolicy plan, unchallengeable
by future generations regardless of their preferences. If this is the case, why
bother requiring that choice should not be regretted? Our emphasis here again
is pragmatic. In practice governments cannot tie the hands of their future selves
perfectly, though they can construct signicant legislative barriers to change. A
commitment that comes to be regretted by future policymakers applying the
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same set of principles as those applied originally (i.e. selecting from the same
choice set)  is presumably more likely to be reversed than one that retains
contingent support. In itself this may provide justication for incorporating
institutional time consistency into the design process.
4 A model of capital taxation
Our focus for the rest of the paper will be on an environment that remains
deterministic, but now features state variables. The aim is to generalise and
characterise more thoroughly the idea of a time-consistent institution devel-
oped in the previous example. To do so when state variables are present is
non-trivial. In particular, preferences across the set of constant promises are
unlikely to have the time-consistency property. The best constant promise to
implement in perpetuity when starting with a low capital stock is not generally
the same as when starting with a high capital stock and the capital stock will
clearly evolve over time regardless of the chosen institution. Nonetheless, we
show that choice sets exist in which time consistency can be achieved, and that
by placing quite mild restrictions on the structure of these sets, much can be
said about the character of time-consistent policy particularly in steady state.
The particular example that we study is a variant of the optimal capital tax
problem studied by Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985). It is a setting in which
Ramsey policy delivers famously extreme outcomes, with initial capital taxes
set to conscatory levels  exploiting the inelasticity of the period-0 capital
stock but then with zero capital taxes in steady state. These outcomes are
so asymmetric over time that it is not plausible to expect a policymaker ever
to commit to a full Ramsey-optimal plan. As mentioned in the introduction,
some authors have chosen to focus their policy advice on the zero capital tax
steady-state result that follows from Ramsey policy. This is true, for instance,
of Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999). But we saw in the previous example
that the steady-state outcome from a Ramsey plan may not have particularly
desirable properties when it is considered in isolation. If time-non-contingent
policy proposals are desired, it would be far preferable to obtain these through a
deliberate, systematic normative procedure. This will, we hope, be a useful step
towards increasing the value to policymakers of models of dynamic taxation.
4.1 Setup
The model is a deterministic representative-agent dynamic tax problem, in
which the government each period must choose linear taxes on capital and labour
income in order to nance a xed expenditure requirement, which for simplicity
we assume to be constant over time. The representative agent obtains positive
utility from a single consumption good, denoted ct for period t, and negative
utility from supplying labour, lt. The agent ranks dynamic consumption and
labour sequences from period 0 onwards according to the function U0, which
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takes the usual time-separable form:
U0 :=
1X
t=0
tu (ct; lt) (16)
with  2 (0; 1) and u satisfying the Inada conditions. The government is benev-
olent, and will treat U0 as its social welfare function from the perspective of
period 0.
In order to guarantee uniqueness of the time-consistent steady state in what
follows, we must impose a further technical condition on preferences. The math-
ematical statement of this is not intuitive, and we relegate it to Section 7.1 in
the appendix. In words, it says that if an agents consumption and labour sup-
ply are increased linearly together, then the wage rate that would be needed to
support the associated allocation must increase at an increasing rate. It is easy
to show that the condition is satised by standard isoelastic preferences:
u (c; l) =
c1    1
1    
l1+
1 + 
provided   1 and   1 are jointly true. This is consistent with conventional
assumptions on the Frisch and intertemporal substitution elasticities. Our ar-
guments can be adjusted to accommodate preferences that are not restricted in
this way, but this complicates the exposition with little gain.
The net production of goods takes place each period according to the xed
function F (k; l), given capital inputs k and labour inputs l. F exhibits the
usual properties.18 Firms choose labour and (rented) capital inputs each period,
given the gross wage rate wt and capital rental rate rt, both expressed in units
of production. Hence they will set wt = Fl;t and rt = Fk;t in order to minimise
their production costs. Capital is owned by consumers, and depreciates at
xed rate . Consumer income from capital, net of a depreciation allowance, is
taxed at rate kt in period t, and labour income is taxed at rate 
l
t. Hence the
consumers owbudget constraint for period t is:
ct + kt+1 
 
1   lt

wtlt +
 
1  kt

(rt   ) + 1

kt (17)
Every period the government must be able to fund its xed consumption
requirement, g > 0. For the problem to deliver a non-trivial time-inconsistency
problem, some restriction must be imposed that prevents this from being done
by levying a su¢ ciently high, one-o¤ capital tax in the initial time period, and
zero taxes thereafter. In principle this is a feasible strategy, as it can allow the
government to obtain a large positive net asset position for period 1 onwards,
and fund all future expenditure from the interest on these assets. Because
the initial capital stock is perfectly inelastic, this scheme is completely non-
distortionary, and obtains a rst best on the set of resource-feasible allocations.
It is also fully time consistent, as continuing to fund expenditure from the
18That is, it is C1, weakly concave, and exhibits constant returns to scale.
18
government asset stock is always an optimal continuation strategy once the
initial capital levy has been applied. One approach to ruling this out is to
impose an upper bound on the capital tax k, or to assume that the period-0
capital tax is xed ex ante.19 We will take the alternative approach of assuming
that the government must run a balanced budget each time period. This has the
advantage of keeping the state vector unidimensional, which makes the dynamics
that result from alternative institutional designs relatively easy to interpret. The
government budget constraint for period t is then given by:
g   ltwtlt + kt (rt   ) kt (18)
Given an initial capital stock k0, a competitive equilibrium with taxes is a
sequence of real allocations fct; lt; kt+1g1t=0, factor prices fwt; rtg1t=0 and taxes
 lt; 
k
t
	1
t=0
such that: (a) the real variables solve the consumer problem of max-
imising U0 on the sequence of ow budget constraints, (17), and transversality;
(b) rms are behaving optimally, with wt = Fl;t and rt = Fk;t for all t; (c)
the government budget constraint (18) holds for all t; and (d) the following
aggregate resource constraint is satised:
ct + kt+1 + g  F (kt; lt) + (1  ) kt (19)
The basic policy problem is to select a desired equilibrium from within the
set of competitive equilibria with taxes. The following proposition simplies
this problem substantially. The proof uses arguments that are well-known in
the dynamic Ramsey taxation literature (e.g. Chari and Kehoe, 1999), and is
therefore omitted.
Proposition 1 An interior allocation fct; lt; kt+1g1t=0 can be supported as a
competitive equilibrium with taxes i¤ for all t  0 it satises (a) the resource
constraint (19) and (b) the following implementabilityrestriction:
 1uc;tkt+1  uc;t+1 (ct+1 + kt+2) + ul;t+1lt+1 (20)
Hence the implementability constraint is su¢ cient to ensure prices and taxes
can be found that will support the given real allocation as a competitive equi-
librium with taxes. The policy problem can then be expressed as direct choice
over real allocations alone the so-called primal approachto optimal taxation.
In words, the implementability condition states that the consumer must be on
his or her ow budget constraint between period t and period t+1, given a set of
prices (wages and e¤ective real interest rates) that are consistent with marginal
rates of substitution perceived in period t. The constraint applies only in period
t: it is not a structural restriction in t+ 1. In general the government will have
an incentive to violate it in period t + 1, taxing away the consumers capital
income. Hence it is the implementability constraint that gives the problem a
Kydland and Prescott character.
19Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) take the former approach, and Chari and Kehoe (1999)
the latter.
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4.2 A two-part problem
As with the example in Section 3, we can divide the normative problem of
choosing a dynamic commitment strategy into an institutional design compo-
nent and a day-to-day policymaking component. To do so we again make
heavy use of promise values. Here these correspond to promises that the total
market value of the consumers expenditure in a given period, less the value of
their labour income that is, the object on the right-hand side of (20) will
equal some minimum value. Again, we can divide the relevant constraint into
promise-making and promise-keeping restrictions, requiring a dynamic sequence
of promise values !0;1 that satisfy, for all t:20
uc;tkt+1  !t+1 (21)
!t  uc;t (ct + kt+1) + ul;tlt (22)
4.2.1 Day-to-day choice
Given !0;1, the day-to-day problem is:
max
fct;lt;kt+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
tu (ct; lt)
subject to (19), (21) and (22), and a given initial capital stock k0. So long
as the commitment to !0;1 is xed, this problem is time consistent. Placing
multiplier tt on the resource constraint (19), 
t1t on the promise-making
constraint (21), and t2t on the promise-keeping constraint (22), necessary
conditions for an interior optimum are:
0 = uc;t   t   1tucc;tkt+1 + 2t fuc;t + ucc;t (ct + kt+1) + ucl;tltg (23)
0 = ul;t + Fl;tt   1tucl;tkt+1 + 2t ful;t + ucl;t (ct + kt+1) + ull;tltg (24)
0 =  t + t+1 [1 + Fk;t+1   ]  1tuc;t + 2tuc;t (25)
We denote by V d0
 
!0;1; k0

the optimised value of the day-to-day problem from
the perspective of period 0.21
4.2.2 Ramsey institutional design
The institutional design problem is then to choose a promise sequence !0;1 ac-
cording to some set of normative criteria. A Ramsey-optimal institution chooses
!0;1 to maximise V d0
 
!0;1; k0

on the unrestricted domain R1, taking k0 as
given. Applying the evelope condition as before, necessary conditions are:
1t = 
2
t+1 (26)
20We retain notational conventions from Section 3 regarding promise sequences.
21 It is possible that the constraint set implied by (19), (21) and (22) is empty for the given
!0;1. In this case we set V d0
 
!0;1; k0

=  1.
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for all t  0 and:
20 = 0 (27)
Substituting (26) into (25) and imposing that all variables are constant, one
recovers the famous Chamley-Judd result that steady-state capital taxes should
be zero under Ramsey policy. In particular, the implication for steady state is:
1 =  [1 + Fk;ss   ] (28)
which is only consistent with optimising behaviour on the part of consumers if
kss = 0.
Condition (27), by contrast, conrms that in period 0 the policymaker is
unencumbered by any past commitments to guarantee the consumer a particular
level of within-period wealth, and will therefore be free to levy a very high capital
tax. Figure 4 shows that this is indeed what is done. It charts the evolution
of the capital tax rate kt under the Ramsey-optimal plan, given a standard
parameterisation.22 The units are simple proportions of net capital income, so
the Figure shows a Ramsey-optimal capital tax in period 0 of the model that
exceeds 300 per cent of net capital income.23 The tax rate then decays to zero
gradually over time.
Figure 5 illustrates the capital dynamics that accompany this tax policy.
This highlights very starkly the time inconsistency problem: despite starting at
its ultimate steady state value, the high initial tax rates cause capital to drop
by around 5 per cent over the rst ten years of the Ramsey plan, only recovering
gradually to steady state over the course of the subsequent decades.
4.2.3 Ramsey policy: discussion
In generating Figure 4 we have assumed an initial capital stock k0 that coincides
with the long-run steady-state kss. This reinforces the time-contingent nature
of Ramsey policy. In period 0 the economy is in almost exactly the same state
as it is in period 60, and yet tax policy could scarcely be more di¤erent between
the two cases.
Even if policymakers had complete condence in the present model as a
positive device, it does not seem realistic that they would ever be willing to
commit to such a plan. The asymmetry in its prescriptions over time renders
it an implausible choice. Precisely why it is implausible is hard to isolate. One
22Specically, we assume a constant-elastic preference specication:
u (c; l) =
c1    1
1    
l1+
1 + 
with  = 1 and  = 2. A period is taken to be one year, and the discount factor  is,
accordingly, set to 0:96. The production function F is a standard Cobb-Douglas with capital
share of 0:33, and the depreciation rate  is 0:05. Finally, g is set to 0:6, which implies that
government consumption is equal to 34 per cent of net output in steady state.
23Clearly one may wish to place an upper bound on capital taxes at 100 per cent (or lower)
for plausibility reasons, but there is no economic reason why obligations in excess of the legal
tax basecould not be imposed.
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possibility is that time-contingent commitments are di¢ cult to rationalise to
the public. It may be easy to explain why capital taxes should change with
the state of the economy, but less simple to explain why they should be set to
punitive levels simply because the current year has been decreed period 0in
the model.
Alternatively, it may be that commitments which exploit the absence of any
initial obligations as implied by condition (27) and have a time-contingent
character as a consequence, are not considered credible. A popular maxim is
that actions speak louder than words. One way to establish credibility for a
new institution in the rst year of its existence is to demonstrate immediately a
readiness to adhere to self-imposed constraints. But if the institution prescribes
a period-0 policy such that !0 is not binding, then this cannot be achieved.
Finally, there are normative arguments that may count against time-contingent
policies. The Ramsey-optimal outcome imposes the preference ranking of the
period-0 policymaker, unconstrained, on all time periods. Even if it is known
that subsequent policymakers will nd continuation with the Ramsey institu-
tion an abhorrence, these later preferences are not considered. It is perfectly
reasonable to have ethical doubts about this approach. Why should preferences
from one time period alone be treated so di¤erently from all others? Is it fair on
future generations, or even democratic, to require that they should implement
an allocation that they had no scope to choose?
Whatever the ultimate reason, it does seem that an economist who rec-
ommends the Ramsey-optimal institution is unlikely to have much practical
inuence. If commitment policy in Kydland and Prescott environments is to be
founded on sound analysis, an alternative normative perspective on institutional
design may be the best way to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
5 Time-consistent institutional design
In the simple two-period OLG model of Section 3 there was an obvious way to
specify a restricted institutional design problem in which choice would be time-
consistent. Since the environment was completely stationary, preference order-
ings over constant promise sequences were bound to remain invariant over time.
But with capital accumulation, preferences over constant promise sequences may
easily change. Nonetheless, we show in what follows that there will still exist
alternative restricted sets of feasible institutions from which policymakers in all
time periods can agree on an optimal choice. If choice is restricted by con-
vention or by constitutional mandate to these sets, the resulting institution
will have the appealing normative property that its selection is not regretted
ex post, given the same set of options. Again, this is not time consistency in
the discretionarysense of allowing repeated, unrestricted choice over alloca-
tions. Promise-keeping constraints may still bind under the chosen institution.
Time consistency instead applies to the selection process for the institutions
that constrain allocations.
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5.1 Preferences and time consistency
As in Section 3, our focus is on consistency between the preference order-
ings of policymakers at di¤erent points in time, ranking alternative dynamic
promise sequences. The added complication now is that state variables will
inuence these preference orderings. Conditional on k0, the period-0 value
function V d0
 
!0;1; k0

generates a binary preference relation over R1 that we
denote %0;k0 . As before, this period-0 preference ordering can be used to rank
promise sequences from generic period t onwards, !t;1, based on the function
V d0
nb!0;t 1; !t;1o ; k0 where for each !t;1:
b!0;t 1 2 arg max
f!0;t 1:f!0;t 1;!t;1g2
0g
V d0
 
!0;t 1; !t;1
	
; k0

given a period-0 institutional constraint set 
0. This ranking is denoted %0;t;k0 ,
and is dened on the set 
t, constructed as before as the set of promise sequences
from t onwards admitted under 
0:

t =

!t;1 2 R1 : !0;t 1; !t;1	 2 
0 for some !0;t 1 2 Rt	
The rankings %t;kt and %t;s;kt (s > t) are dened analogously over R1 and 
s
respectively.
We can then dene time consistency in the institutional design problem as
follows:
Denition 1 For the constraint set 
0 and given k0, let b!0;1 2 argmaxf!0;12
0g V d0  !0;1; k0,
and suppose that the series fkt g1t=0 is an optimal capital choice for the day-to-
day policymaker given k0 and b!0;1.24 We say that institutional choice is time
consistent in 
0 if for all t > s  0, the rankings %t;kt and %s;t;ks over 
t
coincide.
Note that this is an on-equilibriumdenition of time consistency. That is,
it requires consistency between the preferences of initial policymakers and their
successors only along the capital accumulation path that is induced when the
optimal institution in 
0 is selected. The preference mapping %t;kt generally
di¤ers in kt, and so it is not possible to guarantee that %t;kt will coincide with
%s;t;ks for arbitrary kt. Nonetheless, it captures our idea of time-consistent
institutional design as the absence of regret. Assuming that day-to-day choice
evolves in a manner consistent with the optimal institution in 
0, the decision
to select that institution given the same choice set for t onwards will not be
challenged.
The denition does not rule out trivial statements of time-consistent choice:
for instance, institutional choice is time-consistent in any 
0 set that contains
just a single feasible institution, and this institution could always be the period-
0 Ramsey plan. In this sense one could conceivably justify the Ramsey policy
as a time-consistent one in the set that contains it alone  but this is not
24We write k0  k0 for simplicity.
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a particularly useful claim. We are instead interested in the consequences of
reestricting 
0 in as parsimonious a manner as possible. In particular, what are
the minimal restrictions that need to be placed on 
0 to obtain time consistency
in the institutional design problem? These restrictions prevent institutional
designers from taking any decisions that subsequent generations come to regret.
They can perhaps best be thought of as constitutional restrictions on the manner
in which institutions can be designed, whilst the act of choosing institutions
within 
0 can be thought of as the direct legislation process that xes long-
term commitments.
It turns out that we are able to go quite far in describing what a minimally
restrictedset 
0 looks like. In doing so the idea of a degree of freedomfor
policy choice is very useful. We mean by this the following:
Denition 2 Consider a set of possible institutions 
0  R1. We say that

0 exhibits n degrees of freedom at b!0;1 2 
0 if there exist exactly n linearly
independent subspaces of R1 along which the promise series can be varied dif-
ferentially at b!0;1 whilst remaining in 
0.
Thus the number of degrees of freedom at a given point in 
0 is the number
of distinct, joint changes to promise values that the policymaker can make when
choice is restricted to 
0. The unrestricted set R1 has an innite number of
degrees of freedom, as any !t can be chosen for period t without a¤ecting
what can be chosen in any other period. The set of constant promises has just
one degree of freedom: it is impossible to vary !t except by varying all other
promises by an equal amount. The singleton set that contains just the Ramsey
plan has no degrees of freedom.
The following proposition then allows us to place substantial structure on
choice sets that satisfy time consistency:
Proposition 2 Suppose institutional choice is time-consistent in 
0, and letb!0;1 maximise V d0  !0;1; k0 on 
0 given k0, such that V d0 b!0;1; k0 >  1.
Then 
0 has at most one degree of freedom at b!0;1.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 2 suggests that a requirement for time consistency in 
0 will
simplify substantially the institutional design process: choice need be made only
along one degree of freedom, at least in the neighbourhood of the optimum.25
This means that choice within a time-consistent 
0 is e¤ectively equivalent
to selecting the value of at most one parameter, where promises for all time
periods are continuously di¤erentiable in this parameter. To understand this
point better, notice that the proof of Proposition 2 could be applied without
changes to the stationary problem of section 3. In that setting it implies that the
25More generally, it is a straightforward generalisation of the proof of Proposition 2 that a
model whose structure implies an n-dimensional promise vector will have n degrees of freedom
for time-consistent institutional choice. We are grateful to Ramon Marimon for highlighting
this.
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set of constant institutions admits as many degrees of freedom as it is possible to
have in a choice set that is time-consistent. There is unidimensional parametric
choice, where the unique parameter is thepromise value that will obtain in all
periods.
5.2 Steady-state capital taxes
Importantly, it does not follow from Proposition 2 that there is just one possible
parametric class of institutions in which choice is time-consistent: it is just
that if there is a time-consistent choice set, it is unidimensional. To achieve a
unique 
0 we will need to impose some restrictions the structure of admissible
choice sets. It turns out, however, that a relatively weak set of restrictions
is necessary in order to say something quite substantive about the outcomes
of time-consistent choice in steady state. In particular, we show that three
quite parsimonious assumptions are enough to tie down a unique steady-state
outcome. Importantly, and in direct contrast with the steady state of a Ramsey
model, capital taxes will be positive in this steady state.
5.2.1 Three restrictions on 
0
We now explain in turn the three assumptions on 
0 that we impose. First, we
know from Proposition 2 that a minimal necessary restriction is to limit choice
to a single dimension in the neighbourhood of the optimum, and without any
loss we can impose that there is a single degree of freedom everywhere in 
0.
This motivates a focus exclusively on classes of 
0 that have a unidemensional
parametric form, and our rst assumption formalises this. It restricts attention
to 
0 for which there is continuous di¤erentiability of the promises in some
parameter . Hence there is one degree of freedom for choice everywhere in 
0.
Formally:
A 1 (Parametric 
0) There exists a convex set   R and array of C1 functions
f!t : ! Rg1t=0 such that:

0 =

!0;1 2 R1 : !0;1 = f!t ()g1t=0 for some  2 
	
Subject to this unidimensional form which is necessary for time consistency
we wish to restrict 
0 in the minimal way possible. Our second assumption
is a way to ensure this. It requires that any value for !t in R could be obtained
by appropriate choice in 
0. This assumption prevents arbitrary boundaries
being imposed on 
0 in a way that would ensure some preferred choice ruling
out, for instance, restricting 
0 to a singleton that contains just the period-0
Ramsey plan. Formally:
A 2 (Full domain) For any t  0 and !0t 2 R there exists some b!0;1 2 
0 such
that b!t = !0t.
A nal assumption provides a bit more structure on the possible variation
of choice within 
0. It ensures that any movement within the set of possible
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institutions cannot induce unboundedly large changes in one periods promises
relative to anothers. It strengthens A2, which would be consistent, for instance,
with !t varying by an amount 
t for every unit by which !0 is varied. Clearly
as t ! 1 this eliminates the scope for variation in !t except at a punitive
cost in terms of changes to the earlier promises. To prevent this, and ensure
meaningful scope for choice at every horizon, we impose:
A 3 (Bounded relative variation) For any scalar " > 0 there exists a scalar
 > 0 such that for all b!0;1; e!0;1 2 
0, jb!t   e!tj < " implies jb!s   e!sj <  for
all s; t  0.
5.2.2 Deterministic steady state
Assumptions A1 to A3 are certainly non-trivial, but we view them as quite
mild in character. They simply ensure that there is meaningful choice across
institutions in a set that has the maximum number of degrees of freedom possible
for a time-consistent choice set. Despite this, together they are su¢ cient to
ensure a very strong result on steady-state outcomes.
Proposition 3 Suppose that choice within a set 
0 is time-consistent, and that

0 satises assumptions A1 to A3. Then there is a unique steady state to which
real allocations can converge, dened independently of the precise specication
of 
0. This steady state features positive capital taxes.
Proof. See appendix.
Thus time consistency per se is enough to determine steady-state outcomes,
without any additional restrictions on 
0 needed. Under assumptions A1 to A3,
the steady state of any time-consistent institutional choice will be characterised
by the solution to a set of non-linear simultaneous equations, with as many
equations as there are variables to solve for. The maintained assumption on
preferences given by Condition 1 in the appendix ensures that these equations
have a unique solution.
The table below compares the values of capital and labour income tax rates
in steady state under Ramsey and time-consistent institutions, using the same
parameterisation as Figure 4.
Ramsey-optimal Time-consistent
kss 0 0:28
 lss 0:54 0:50
The absolute magnitude of the increase in capital taxes between the Ram-
sey and time-consistent steady states 28 percentage points is clearly much
greater than the associated reduction in labour income taxes. But one should
be cautious about dismissing the merits of the time-consistent allocation on this
basis alone. Assuming that welfare losses are roughly proportional to the sum
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of the squares of the taxes, there is surprisingly little to separate the two. A
direct welfare comparison between the two steady states will nd in favour of
the Ramsey path, but this is a misleading comparison as the capital stock is
lower in the time-consistent case. This implies lower welfare, but only after dif-
ferent transition paths have been followed. Steady-state welfare is not the main
policy criterion: if it were then the Ramsey policy could be improved upon still
further by letting the policymakers discount factor approach unity.
Why does time-consistent policy involve positive steady-state taxes? The
reason is that time-consistent institutional choice must be made jointly for all
time periods, along one parametric dimension. This means that any benets
from relaxing the period-0 promise-keeping constraint must be accompanied
by costs from tightening the period-0 promise-making constraint along with
additional changes to these constraints at all future horizons. This contrasts
with the Ramsey institutional design problem, in which benets from relaxing
the period-1 promise-keeping constraint are equated with costs from tightening
the period-0 promise making constraint. The di¤erence in timing implies a
di¤erence in relative discounting, with the e¤ect that instead of the steady-
state multipliers satisfying 1ss = 
2
ss, as implied by (26) in the Ramsey case,
we have 1ss = 
2
ss.
Very loosely, the e¤ect is a policy that strikes a balance between the short-
term incentive for high capital taxes and the long-run incentive to eliminate
distortions. Recall that the main reason for zero steady-state capital taxes being
optimal in the Ramsey case is that a positive rate would imply an e¤ective tax
wedge on the period-t good that is growing at a compound rate in t. This is
generally ine¢ cient relative to a constant wedge. But the losses that result
from departing from zero steady-state taxes do not accrue immediately, and
the lower is  the more they will be discounted when institutions are initially
chosen. By contrast, there are gains to allowing high capital taxes in the very
rst time period, since capital is inelastic initially. The joint restrictions on
choice that are required by time consistency mean that high taxes can only be
implemented initially if they are also implemented in steady state. Hence the
long-term losses from positive steady-state taxes are traded o¤ against short-
term gains from taxing an inelastic factor. The result is a positive but modest
steady-state capital tax. Only as  ! 1 is the optimality of zero steady-state
taxes restored.
For this reason it can certainly be argued that positive steady-state capital
taxes are the product of a short-termist perspective on policy. Any gains
relative to a zero capital tax policy will be exhausted during the early periods
of the model. But if a more long-term perspective on optimality is desired
then, again, the obvious way to achieve it is to raise the policymakers discount
factor above the households . So long as the future is discounted it should not
be surprising that high capital taxes are favoured, given the trade-o¤ we have
constructed.
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6 Transition dynamics
Proposition 3 provides extremely useful insight into the long-run character of
time-consistent institutions, but it says nothing about transition paths. For
this we need to place more structure on the sets from which time-consistent
choice is made. In general there are many 
0 sets satisfying assumptions A1 to
A3 in which choice is time-consistent. Each of these will be associated with a
distinct optimal promise sequence, and hence a distinct prescription for optimal
taxes. Some additional selection is thus needed. In this section we propose
three further restrictions on the character of optimal policy, and show that
these are su¢ cient to deliver a unique choice. Whilst the resulting allocations
have appealing properties, our approach is just one possible way to resolve the
multiplicity. We remain open to the possibility that alternatives may have equal
or greater appeal, and clarifying this issue will be an interesting avenue for future
work.
6.1 Obtaining uniqueness
The problem we have is how to select a unique time-consistent choice set 
0,
given the initial capital stock k0. The set 
0 must vary in k0 if it is to be time-
consistent for all k0. If it did not then the only clear candidate satisfying A1 is
the set of constant promises, but it is easy to show that choice within this set is
not time-consistent, so long as k0 is away from the steady state characterised in
the previous section.26 Thus we are searching for a unique set-valued mapping

0 (k0), with 
0 : R! R1, where the output of this mapping must satisfy A1
to A3.
Associated with each 
0 (k0) is an optimal institutional choice, b!0;1 (k0),
which satises:27
b!0;1 (k0) 2 arg max
!0;12
0(k0)
V d0
 
!0;1; k0

(29)
In response to the chosen institution b!0;1 (k0), capital evolves optimally accord-
ing to the series fkt (k0)g1t=1. By denition, if choice in 
0 (k0) is time-consistent
then the continuation of b!0;1 (k0) from t onwards, b!t;1 (k0), will then be an
optimal choice under preferences %t;kt (k0) in the corresponding continuation set

t (k0), dened as before for all k0:

t (k0) =

!t;1 2 R1 : !0;t 1; !t;1	 2 
0 (k0) for some !0;t 1 2 Rt	
The additional restrictions that we make will relate to the structure of 
0 (k0)
and 
t (k0) as k0 varies.
26 In principle time-varying unidimensional choice sets  such that 
t di¤ers from 
0, but
both are invariant to k0 would also be consistent with A1. Again, it is easy to show that
these cannot deliver time-consistent choice for all k0.
27 It is possible that the argmax set may contain multiple elements. In this case it is unlikely
that more than one of these implies time-consistent choice, and b!0;1 (k0) is then the unique
element that does so. If there is more than one element in the argmax set that implies
time-consistent choice, selection among them can be by any arbitrary procedure.
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6.1.1 Two further restrictions on 
0
Our rst step towards obtaining uniqueness is the following assumption:
A 4 (Time invariance) For all k0 2 R+ and all t > 0:

t (k0) = 
0 (k

t (k0)) (30)
That is, the continuation set of promise series available in 
t when the
initial capital stock was k0 must coincide with the initial set of promise series
available when the initial capital stock is kt (k0). Put di¤erently, there can be
no time contingency in the choice set: if the capital stock in period t is kt then
there is a unique possible structure for 
t, whether t = 0 and 
t is the initial
choice set, or t > 0 and 
t is a continuation of 
0, with kt = kt (k0) for an
initial k0. It is, above all, the time-contingent character of Ramsey policy that
makes it an implausible candidate for practical policy design. Since our aim
is to design a choice framework that will deliver more realistic rules than the
Ramsey framework, we lose little from ruling out such contingency.
The second assumption is the following:
A 5 (No envy) Fix k0; k00 2 R+, and suppose the series !0;1 (k0) 2 
0 (k0)
and !0;1 (k00).2 
0 (k00) converge to the same ! 2 R. Then !0;1 (k0) %0;k0
!0;1 (k00).
An 
0 (k0) choice set that satises assumptions A1 to A4 is one in which
there is one dimension of choice, and in which (by A2) every ! 2 R is a possible
selection for the long-run promise value. This means that choice over 
0 (k0) is
equivalent to choice of the long-run promise. To the extent that the sets 
0 (k0)
and 
0 (k00) di¤er, it is in the structure of their promise sequences prior to con-
vergence. Assumption A5 considers promise sequences that induce convergence
to the same long-run promise value and in this sense are equivalentchoices
 for distinct k0. The assumption requires that among any set of promise se-
quences that are equivalent in this sense, each policymaker should prefer the
one that is actually available to them, relative to those that would be available
for alternative k0 values.
This is the stronger of the two assumptions made in this Section. It captures
the idea that the set of options available to any one policymaker should not be
envied by any other. Why impose such a condition? Variations in the initial
capital stock will be associated, in general, with variations in the value of an
optimal institution. This happens for two reasons. The rst is the usual fact
that more capital expands the feasible set of real allocations. The second is that
variations in the initial capital stock induce changes in 
0 (k0), and this in turn
a¤ects the value of the policies available. This second factor may allow for some
quite perverse outcomes. It is quite possible, for instance, to construct time-
consistent choice sets satisfying assumptions A1 to A4, in which lower values for
the capital stock are associated with a higher value for the optimal institution.
This happens if lower k0 values deliver an 
0 (k0) set in which the optimal initial
30
promise allows for very high initial capital taxes, bringing outcomes close to the
Ramsey plan, whilst higher values for k0 are associated with low initial taxes.
There is something unsatisfactory about such cases. The variation in value
induced by di¤erences in the choice sets seems very arbitrary: some starting
values for k0 are simply given favourabletreatment relative to others. At the
same time, ruling out all variation in the promise values a priori would be too
strong. It is quite possible that when k0 is low, a di¤erent promise sequence is
best suited to delivering a desired steady state, relative to the case in which k0
is high. A5 allows for di¤erences between promise sequences that deliver the
same steady state as k0 varies, but only where these di¤erences are mutually
benecial  that is, where an institutional designer in initial state k0 will not
envy the promises available in state k00, and vice-versa.
6.1.2 Uniqueness
Given these additional restrictions, we can state the following. The proof is in
the appendix.
Proposition 4 For all k0 2 R+, suppose that 
0 (k0) satises assumptions A1
to A5, that optimal choice in 
0 (k0) is time-consistent, and that real allocations
converge to a steady state given this optimal choice. Then the optimal choice in

0 (k0) sets b!t (k0) = !ss for all t, where !ss is the unique steady-state promise
consistent with Proposition 3.
This result hinges on the no envy assumption, A5. It means that any
increase in k0 at the margin can increase the value of optimal policy only through
the direct e¤ectof a higher capital stock there can be no indirect e¤ectdue
to a more (or less) favourable set of promise values. If there were, changing the
promise values b!0;1 (k0) by varying k0 at the margin would raise the value of
policy. This is inconsistent with the assumption that b!0;1 (k0) is optimal in
the set of possible b!0;1 (k00) sequences when initial capital is k0. But the only
type of sequence for which the marginal benet to raising the capital stock is
always equal to the direct e¤ect, irrespective of k0, is a constant sequence 
and the only constant promise consistent with time-consistent optimality and
convergence is !ss.
6.1.3 Are constant promises too restrictive?
On the surface, imposing the same value for !t in every time period may ap-
pear unduly restrictive. It suggests that the market value of the consumers
net purchases should match a given, constant value each period, even whilst
capital accumulation may be expanding the feasible set of allocations. But it
is important not to neglect the units in which value is assessed here. Consider
rewriting the promise-keeping constraint as follows:
!t
uc;t
 (ct + kt+1)  wt  1   lt lt (31)
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where we have substituted wt
 
1   lt

in place of the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between consumption and labour supply. The object on the right-hand-side
is value of the consumers purchases net of labour income in period t that is,
purchases from wealth taken into period t assessed in units of the real con-
sumption good. If our restriction were that this object must be held constant,
it would be an extremely strong one. In e¤ect, the consumers real disposable
non-labour wealth would be being held constant, even as the aggregate capital
stock of the economy might be growing. But a constant value for !t instead
xes the minimum value of these net purchases relative to the inverse of the
marginal utility of consumption, 1uc;t . This object, in turn, can be read as the
marginal resource cost of an extra unit of utility in period t, likewise expressed
in units of the consumption good. Hence the restriction xes the real value of
disposable non-labour wealth in period t only relative to real marginal cost of
utility. In periods when real wealth is low, consumption will likewise be low,
and so too will be the marginal cost of utility provision. Thus the constraint is
sensitive to the dynamics of capital accumulation: it will be relatively easy to
satisfy when the aggregate capital stock is low.
Another way to make the same point is to consider the promise-keeping
constraint in the more general case that the optimal choice for !t varies in the
contemporaneous value of, say, kt, and so we can write: !t = ! (kt). In this
case the promise-keeping constraint can be written:
! (kt)  uc;t (ct + kt+1) + ul;tlt (32)
But evidently we could rewrite the constraint:
t 
uc;t (ct + kt+1) + ul;tlt
! (kt)
(33)
The invariant choice of t = 1 will clearly now be optimal for all t the point
being that re-basing the numeraire can always imply a constant promise is
optimal in some version of the problem. It just happens that under the no
envyassumption the version for which this is true is the one we study.
6.2 The structure of 
0
When these assumptions are made on 
0 (k0), the choice set can be studied
numerically. Figures 6 and 7 provide two graphical representations of it, for
cases in which capital starts 10 per cent below and above steady state respec-
tively.28 The lines in the gure correspond to alternative dynamic sequences for
28The gure is generated as follows. First we solve for the optimal dynamic path in 
0, given
the (known) constant promise !. Then we determine the loss to the present value of welfare
that would follow if an alternative constant promise were chosen, starting with a capital stock
equal to the time-consistent steady-state level. Finally we work backwards through time,
nding a promise in each period that will deliver the same welfare loss in present value terms,
given a starting capital stock consistent with the accumulation dynamic witnessed on the
optimal path.
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0 (k0): k0 10 per cent below steady state
the promises, the institutional design choice being to select from among them.29
In each case the optimal choice is the central, time-invariant line. Time con-
sistency implies that this choice remains optimal as time progresses, given the
associated capital accumulation dynamic. We compute suboptimal paths under
the assumption that the loss to switching from the optimal path to any one of
the alternatives graphed is invariant along the optimal path, where this loss is
assessed at the point in time when the switch takes place.
Figures 6 and 7 illustrate the role of the capital stock on the shape of 
0 (k0).
When capital starts below steady state, as in Figure 6, relatively small changes
in initial promise values are able to induce relatively large changes in utility.
The result is that the choice set bows inwards, as a given reduction in the value
of the promise sequence is initially obtainable through smaller departures in the
promises from the optimal choice. By contrast, when the capital stock starts
high, as in Figure 7, greater initial departures in the promises are needed to
obtain a given reduction in value: the choice set fans out. Once the capital
stock is in steady state, time consistency is ensured by a time-invariant choice
set: that is, the lines become parallel to one another.
The time-dependence of the sub-optimal choices in Figures 6 and 7 reects
the fact that optimal institutional choice in 
0 (k0) is time-consistent only along
the equilibrium path. Suppose that in period s a sub-optimal institution in

0 (k0) were to be selected, and suppose that optimal choice for the inner
29The lines graphed are a selection from the continuum of elements in 
0.
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Figure 7: Structure of 
0 (k0): k0 10 per cent above steady state
problem up to period t > s then delivered a capital stock of kt, given this insti-
tutuion. Then the continuation choice set 
t (k0) will not coincide with 
0 (kt)
that is, the time-consistent choice set associated with this unanticipated value
of the capital stock. Optimal choice in the continuation set will thus no longer
be time-consistent. The o¤-equilibrium paths in Figures 6 and 7 are tailored to
the capital accumulation dynamic associated with optimal institutional choice,
and any alternative accumulation will undermine the time-consistency of insti-
tutional preferences.
Our assumption throughout this paper is that a commitment technology is
available, and for this reason the failure to guarantee time-consistent institu-
tional design o¤-equilibrium is a second-order concern. Our aim is not to solve
for the subgame-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic game: it is to devise a means
for choosing long-run policy plans that will not later come to be regretted, given
the same set of options.
6.3 Simulated dynamics
Consistent with the preceeding discussion, Figures 8 and 9 illustrate the dynam-
ics of capital and labour tax rates when promise values are held xed at their
time-consistent steady-state level, and k0 is set to 90 per cent, 100 per cent and
110 per cent of the time-consistent steady-state capital stock.
A low initial capital stock induces lower capital taxes, which incentivises
34
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
Time (years)
ta
u k
k0 = kss
k0 = 1.1*kss
k0 = 0.9*kss
Figure 8: Capital taxes: time-consistent institutional policy
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0.47
0.48
0.49
0.5
0.51
0.52
0.53
0.54
Time (years)
ta
u l
k0 = kss
k0 = 1.1*kss
k0 = 0.9*kss
Figure 9: Labour taxes: time-consistent institutional policy
35
faster accumulation. Government expenditure requirements are xed, and these
lower capital taxes must be substituted with higher labour taxes initially. When
capital starts above steady state the dynamics are roughly symmetric, with high
initial capital taxes and low labour taxes. These qualitative patterns are not
robust for all calibrations. Importantly, if the elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution falls below 0:5, a low initial capital stock comes to be associated with
higher capital taxes and lower labour taxes, relative to steady state. A low
value for the EIS corresponds to a situation in which the price e¤ectof lower
consumption substantially dominates the quantity e¤ect, which ultimately im-
plies that the promise-keeping constraint can be relaxed by constraining capital
accumulation rather than enhancing it.
More signicantly, it is clear that time-consistent institutional design does
not share the time-contingent character of Ramsey policy  as distinct from
state contingency. If the the economy starts in steady state, it will remain
there in perpetuity. Recall, by contrast, that a Ramsey institutional designer
who inherits a capital stock at the Ramsey steady-state level will raise capital
taxes to punitive levels, and induce a fall in the capital stock before returning
it gradually back to steady state.
6.3.1 Welfare comparisons
Comparing welfare between time-consistent institutions and alternatives  in-
cluding Ramsey policy is complicated by the fact that di¤erent capital dynam-
ics are induced in each case. From any initial capital stock, the Ramsey-optimal
policy is clearly welfare-superior, but the magnitude of the gains from it are
surprisingly modest. If capital starts at the steady-state value associated with
time-consistent policy, the welfare gains from a Ramsey institution relative to a
time-consistent institution under our benchmark calibration are equivalent to a
permanent consumption gain of 1:6 percentage points (from the time-consistent
steady-state level). The variability of taxes is an order of magnitude lower under
time-consistent policy, but welfare is certainly not.
An alternative comparison can be made by considering the consequences of
switching to a time-consistent policy when starting in the Ramsey steady state
that is, assuming that many years have elapsed since Ramsey policy was rst
implemented, and considering the benets to changing to an alternative constant
set of promises. For our benchmark calibration the gains are positive, and
equivalent to a permanent consumption gain of 0:4 percentage points relative to
the Ramsey steady state. As emphasised in Section 5.2, this is not to say that
the steady-state allocation associated with time-consistent policy is preferable
to the steady-state outcome of Ramsey policy: the capital stock is ultimately
lower in the former case, due to positive capital taxes. But if a society were to
nd itself in Ramsey steady state and consider the benets of switching to a
time-consistent institution, assessing welfare along the transition path, it would
wish to do so.
The reverse does not apply: starting from steady state under the time-
consistent institution and switching to the constant sequence of promises asso-
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ciated with Ramsey steady state will always be welfare worsening. Indeed, a
direct corollary to Proposition 3 is that the steady state associated with optimal
time-consistent policy is the only steady state for which there are no benets
from switching to an alternative constant promise sequence.30
The table below summarises these welfare comparisons. The rst row lists
the equivalent permanent percentage consumption gain associated with switch-
ing from the Ramsey steady state to, in turn, a full Ramsey-optimal path, and
a time-consistent institution. The second row lists the equivalent consumption
gain associated with switching from the time-consistent steady-state path to
the Ramsey plan and the Ramsey steady-state institution.31 In all cases these
welfare gains are assessed at the point in time that the switch is made.
New institution:
k0: Ramsey Ramsey ss Time-consistent
Ramsey ss 1:91% 0 0:41%
Time-consistent ss 1:57%  0:37% 0
7 Conclusion
When expectations of future policy a¤ect what can be done today, time incon-
sistency exists in two distinct forms. The rst is unavoidable: without some
sort of institutional commitment device, policy variables will be determined
as the outcome of a dynamic leadership game between policymakers at di¤er-
ent horizons, each choosing only from the period-specic choice set available to
them. It is well known that the equilibrium of this game need not be Pareto e¢ -
cient: policymakers at all horizons would be better o¤ under alternative feasible
schemes. This is the sense in which time inconsistencyis widely understood as
a concept, and large literatures exist contrasting outcomes in di¤erent problems
when policy is set by commitmentand discretion.
But a second form of time inconsistency also applies to the commitment
problem itself, and this has been the main focus of the current paper. It is not
just that all policymakers can be made better o¤ by implementing rules rather
than discretion. The problem of designing appropriate rules  institutional
design, as we have labelled it is itself time-inconsistent, at least when there
are no restrictions placed on the set of institutions that can be considered. The
best promise for period t when choosing a Ramsey plan in period 0 di¤ers from
the best promise for period t when choosing a Ramsey plan in some other period
s  t. Thus Ramsey plans would not survive an unexpected re-evaluation.
30 It is possible that an alternative constant promise sequence could improve on the time-
consistent institution when capital is away from steady state, but the choice of this alternative
sequence would itself not be time consistent along the induced accumulation path. Recall that
when k0 departs from steady state, almost all of the promise sequences in 
0 are time-varying.
31The latter is interpreted as a switch to constant promises, equal to the promise value
associated with Ramsey steady state.
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Our purpose in this paper has been to ask what sorts of outcomes would
result if the problem of designing institutions were restricted in a way that
ensured it was time consistent. That is, suppose that dynamic sequences of
policy commitments could only be chosen from a restricted set, deliberately
constructed to ensure that the best choice from within this set in period 0
remains the best choice in a subsequent period s. What does optimal time-
consistent choice of this kind look like? The idea is not that institutional design
should be assumed actually to take place period-by-period. If this were true
then we would return to the ine¢ cient Stackelberg equilibrium of traditional
discretion. We are just interested in making sure that if an institution is re-
compared with the same set of alternatives from which it was originally chosen,
it should remain the best choice  always under the assumption that if it is
chosen, it will endure permanently.
Applying this criterion to the institutional design problem can go a supris-
ingly long way in determining policy choice. In particular, we have shown in the
context of an optimal capital tax problem that if institutional design is time-
consistent then the choice set from which institutions are selected can have at
most one degree of freedom in the neighbourhood of an optimum. This means
that time-consistent choice must be equivalent to selecting a single policy para-
meterthat jointly determines commitments in all time periods. If the economic
environment under study were stationary with no endogenous state variables
then this choice parameter could be thought of as a constant policy rule, to
be implemented in all time periods. When the state of the economy may evolve
over time, the parameter is a single leverfor varying rules in all periods jointly,
but the precise rule that is associated with a given period can also depend on
the state of the economy.
More signicantly, we have demonstrated that if institutions are required to
be chosen from choice sets that admit time consistency, three apparently mild
assumptions on the structure of these sets will be enough to induce a unique
steady-state outcome.32 This steady state di¤ers in a systematic way from the
steady state of Ramsey policy, most noticeably because it involves a positive,
though relatively small, capital tax. The reason why a positive tax is optimal,
despite implying that there will be long-run distortions to productive decisions
in the economy, is that this is the only way to ensure a positive capital tax in the
rst period of the model given the joint restrictions that are imposed on policy
choice. The short-term benets of taxing an inelastic factor are directly traded
o¤ against long-run costs. Under the Ramsey institutional design paradigm
this trade-o¤ can be avoided: a high initial capital tax and a low long-run rate
can be selected independently. But this is precisely what gives Ramsey policy
its unrealistic avour: policymakers in practice do not legislate such directly
time-contingent policy schemes into existence.
We have deliberately focused our attention in this paper on a model that
is simple and already well understood, so as to extract the key implications of
32These assumptions are that the choice set should have a single degree of freedom every-
where, should allow in principle  for any conceivable promise to be chosen in a given time
period, and should ensure meaningful joint variation in promises at every horizon.
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time-consistent institutional design as clearly as possible. But this has meant
abstracting from one important problem: how to incorporate stochastic shocks
into the analysis. We have shown that time-consistent institutional design in
deterministic settings can only have at most one meaningful degree of freedom
to vary policy promises in the di¤erent time periods. It is certainly not clear
that this will remain the case when randomness a¤ects the economy. Subsequent
work will consider precisely this problem.
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Appendix
7.1 Assumption on preferences
We place the following technical restriction on u. This is not central to our
arguments, and will be used only to ensure the uniqueness of the time-consistent
steady state:
Condition 1 Consider any two allocations (c0; l0) and (c00; l00), with (c00; l00) >
(c0; l0) (in the product order sense). Let w () be the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure at an allocation that is a convex combination
of these two:
w () :=  ul (c
00 + (1  ) c0; l00 + (1  ) l0)
uc (c00 + (1  ) c0; l00 + (1  ) l0) (34)
We assume:
d2w ()
d2
> 0 (35)
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Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let  2   R describe an arbitrary parameterisation of the promise
values, such that f!t ()g1t=0 2 
0 for all  2 , f!t ()g1t=0 = b!0;1 for some
 2 , and !t () is continuously di¤erentiable in  when  = . Let ~ describe
an alternative parameterisation with exactly the same properties, and ~

dened
correspondingly. We wish to show that if choice in 
0 satises time consistency
then the di¤erential changes
n
d!t()
d

=
o1
t=0
cannot be linearly independent
from their ~ equivalents

d!t(~)
d~

~=~

1
t=0
. Consider rst the change induced
by . Since b!0;1 is optimal in 
0, by the envelope theorem we must have:
1X
t=0
t

1t
d!t+1 ()
d

=
  2t
d!t ()
d

=

= 0 (36)
where 1t and 
2
t are the multipliers that follow from the day-to-day policy
problem when b!0;1 is chosen. The assumption that V d0 b!0;1; k0 >  1
implies there is a choice in 
0 that allows for a non-empty choice set in the day-
to-day problem, and hence these multipliers are well dened. If the problem is
non-trivial there must also exist at least one multiplier that is strictly positive.
If not the day-to-day policymaker is unconstrained by the optimal institution in

0, but if this is true then the day-to-day policymaker must select the rst-best
allocation subject to the resource constraint (19) alone. Our starting position
is that this is not attainable.
By time consistency an equivalent condition to (36) must hold for variations
in 
s for all s  0:
1X
t=s
t s

1t
d!t+1 ()
d

=
  2t
d!t ()
d

=

= 0 (37)
This is only possible if changes to  induce zero marginal loss on a period-by-
period basis:
1t
d!t+1 ()
d

=
  2t
d!t ()
d

=
= 0 (38)
An equivalent condition is required for the changes induced by ~:
1t
d!t+1

~

d~

~=~

  2t
d!t

~

d~

~=~

= 0 (39)
Since (38) and (39) are evaluated at the same point, the shadow values

1t ; 
2
t
	
are identical across the two equations for all t. It follows that if they both hold
for all t then either
n
d!t()
d

=
o1
t=0
must equal

  d!t(~)
d~

~=~

1
t=0
, for some
 2 R. Hence we cannot have linear independence.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. If allocations converge to a steady state then, from (21) and (22), the
optimal promises in 
0 must do likewise, and so too the multipliers 
1
ss, 
2
ss
and ss. It follows from assumption A1 that optimal choice within 
0 can be
treated as the selection of a single parameter  2   R, where the promises
are C1 with respect to this parameter. By continuity and assumption A2 the
optimal choice of  cannot be at the boundary of  unless the optimal promises
are of innite magnitude, which is easily seen to be inconsistent with resource
feasibility and hence incompatible with steady state. It follows that a rst-
order condition will characterise the optimal choice of  if any steady state is
obtained, and by time consistency this condition must match (38) above:
d!t+1 ()
d

=
=
2ss
1ss
d!t ()
d

=
(40)
where  is the optimal parameter choice, and we allow for now the possibility
that d!t()d

=
need not be constant in t. But the continuity of d!t()d for all
t means that assumption A3 would be violated unless 
2
ss
1ss
= 1 (otherwise the
e¤ect of changing  on !t relative to !0 would be growing or decaying without
bound in t). Hence in any steady state d!t()d

=
will be constant in t, and
we must have:
2ss = 
1
ss (41)
This condition, together with constraints (19), (21) and (22) and the rst-
order conditions from the day-to-day problem, (23) to (25), provide a set of
seven non-linear equations in seven unknowns. Generically this system will
have a nite number of solutions. We show below that Condition 1 is in fact
su¢ cient to guarantee uniqueness in the solution, conditional on existence. But
this part of the proof is quite involved, so for the sake of the general reader
more interested in the positivity of steady-state capital taxes we demonstrate
this claim rst.
Substituting expression (41) into a steady-state version of the rst-order
condition for optimal choice of capital in the day-to-day problem, (25), gives:
 (1 + Fk;ss   ) = 1 + (1  ) 
1
ss
ss
uc;ss (42)
A necessary condition for optimal consumer choice in the steady state of a
decentralised economy with capital tax kss is:


1 +
 
1  kss

(Fk;ss   )

= 1 (43)
Hence the optimum in the restricted choice set will have a positive capital tax
i¤:
(1  ) 
1
ss
ss
uc;ss > 0 (44)
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The resource constraint clearly binds, so to guarantee positive capital taxes we
need to rule out 1ss = 0. Suppose this were true. Then the implementability
condition would be slack:
 1uc;sskss < uc;ss (css + kss) + ul;sslss (45)
which means that the steady-state allocation would be rst best. In particular,
we would have:
ul;ss + uc;ssFl;ss = 0 (46)
and:
 (1 + Fk;ss   ) = 1 (47)
Substituting the previous two expressions into (45) gives:
(Fk;ss   ) kss < css   Fl;sslss (48)
or, using the homogeneity properties of F :
css > F (kss; lss)  kss (49)
This is clearly incompatible with resource feasibility.
It remains to show that the steady state is unique. This is di¢ cult, ul-
timately because of the well-known problem in Ramsey tax settings that the
implementability constraint need not describe a convex set of allocations, and
this allows the possibility of local optima that are not globally best. We can
nonetheless prove it under Condition 1 as follows. The set of seven equations
characterising steady state can equivalently be obtained as a set of necessary
requirements for an interior solution to the following staticproblem:33
max
c;l;k
u (c; l)
subject to:
c+ g + k  F (k; l) +    1

k (50)
and:
uck   [uc (c+ k) + ull] (51)
where  is set to be the multiplier on (50) and 1 on (51), and 2 and ! can be
dened by:
2 = 1 (52)
and:
! =  1uck (53)
respectively. Consider two distinct allocations fc0; l0; k0g and fc00; l00; k00g that
are both feasible and implementable,34 and deliver the same value for u (c; l).
33We drop the steady-state subscripts for convenience here.
34That is, satisfy (50) and (51).
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Without loss of generality, suppose (c00; l00) > (c0; l0). Suppose we can show that
any convex combination between fc0; l0; k0g and fc00; l00; k00g will also be feasible
and implementable, for all such choices. Then it will follow by usual arguments
that any rst-order necessary conditions are also su¢ cient for the unique global
optimum. Hence any solution to the seven equations that characterise steady
state must also be unique.
The feasibility constraint (50) clearly describes a convex set of allocations, so
if fc0; l0; k0g and fc00; l00; k00g are feasible then f(1  ) c0 + c00; (1  ) l0 + l00; (1  ) k0 + k00g
must be likewise, for all  2 [0; 1]. It remains to show that implementability is
preserved at intermediate points. Without loss we focus on the case in which
fc0; l0; k0g and fc00; l00; k00g both satisfy (51) with equality.35 In this case we have:
c0     1   1 k0 + u0l
u0c
l0 = 0 (54)
and:
c00     1   1 k00 + u00l
u00c
l00 = 0 (55)
For implementability to hold at intermediate points, we need:
[(1  ) c0 + c00]    1   1 [(1  ) k0 + k00]  w () [(1  ) l0 + l00]  0
(56)
where w () is as dened in the statement of Condition 1. Using the preceeding
two expressions in this to eliminate the terms in c and k, and rearranging, it is
su¢ cient that we have the following:
l00 [w ()  w00] + (1  ) l0 [w ()  w0]  0 (57)
Since (c00; l00) > (c0; l0), and utility is the same for the two allocations, we must
have w00 > w () > w0 for all  2 (0; 1), and w () is a monotone increas-
ing function on [0; 1]. By Condition 1 w () is additionally convex. Hence by
Jensens inequality we have:
l00 [w ()  w00] + (1  ) l0 [w ()  w0] (58)
 l00 [[(1  )w0 + w00]  w00] + (1  ) l0 [[(1  )w0 + w00]  w0](59)
=   (1  ) (l00   l0) (w00   w0) (60)
< 0 (61)
as required.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The proof works by showing that when assumptions A1 to A5 hold, it is
impossible for b!t (k0) to depend on k0. If b!0;1 (k0) is a time-consistent optimal
35 If the inequality were strict then a local movement along the line between the two points
would clearly preserve strict implementability for values of  close enough to 0 or 1. If there
were some values f0; 00g at which equality held, the arguments in the main text can be
applied relative to these points.
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plan, we know from Proposition 3 that either b!t must converge to !ss or real
allocations do not converge. The latter case is ignored by the assumption of the
proposition. Invariance and convergence to !ss are possible only if b!t = !ss for
all t.
Taking the total derivative of V d0
b!0;1 (k0) ; k0 with respect to k0, we have:
dV d0
b!0;1 (k0) ; k0
dk0
=
@V d0
b!0;1 (k0) ; k0
@k0
(62)
+
1X
t=0
@V d0
b!0;1 (k0) ; k0
@b!t (k0) db!t (k0)dk0
But from Assumption A5, switching to a promise series associated with an
alternative initial capital stock cannot improve the policymakers welfare. Hence
we also have:
1X
t=0
@V d0
b!0;1 (k0) ; k0
@b!t (k0) db!t (k0)dk0 = 0 (63)
or: 1X
t=0
t

1t
db!t+1 (k0)
dk0
  2t
db!t (k0)
dk0

= 0 (64)
By time invariance, a similar condition must hold for the promises observed
from period s onwards:
1X
t=0
t

1t
db!t+1 (ks (k0))
dks (k0)
  2t
db!t (ks (k0))
dks (k0)

= 0 (65)
where ks (k0) is the optimal capital stock for period t given b!0;1 (k0). By
assumption A4 we have:
b!t (ks (k0)) = b!t+s (k0) (66)
And thus:
db!t (ks (k0))
dks (k0)
dks (k0)
dk0
=
db!t+s (k0)
dk0
(67)
Setting s = 1, pre-multiplying the left-hand side of (65) by  dk

s (k0)
dk0
and using
the result in (64) gives:
10
db!1 (k0)
dk0
= 20
db!0 (k0)
dk0
(68)
The time invariance assumption implies, by symmetry, that for all t we must
also then have:
1t
db!1 (kt (k0))
dkt (k0)
= 2t
db!0 (kt (k0))
dkt (k0)
(69)
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so:
1t
db!t+1 (kt (k0))
dkt (k0)
dkt (k0)
dk0
= 2t
db!t (kt (k0))
dkt (k0)
dkt (k0)
dk0
(70)
1t
db!t+1 (k0)
dk0
= 2t
db!t (k0)
dk0
(71)
From this it follows that either db!t(k0)dk0 = 0 for all t, or db!0(k0)dk0 takes a
non-zero value, and for all t  0 db!t+1(k0)dk0 satises the recursion:
db!t+1 (k0)
dk0
=
2t
1t
db!t (k0)
dk0
(72)
Suppose this latter condition is indeed true. Convergence implies:
lim
t!1

db!t (k0)
dk0

= 0 (73)
That is, the sequence induced by (72) converges to zero. But notice that an
identical recursion is satised by db!t(k0)d : the derivative of b!t along the unique
degree of freedom available to the policymaker. We have:
db!t+1 (k0)
d
=
2t
1t
db!t (k0)
d
(74)
for all t  0 and arbitrary non-zero db!0(k0)d . But by assumption A3 this sequence
cannot converge to zero. This is a contradiction, leaving db!t(k0)dk0 = 0 as the only
possibility.
47
